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INTRODUCTION

Racial segregation of the public schools in New York City — the
largest school district in the United States — was ignored by advocates

*

David Tipson is the Executive Director of New York Appleseed.
Rene Kathawala serves as Orrick’s pro bono counsel, coordinating all of the Firm’s
pro bono work. In addition, Mr. Kathawala maintains an active public interest
workload that includes leading the Firm’s effort in connection with the desegregation
work discussed herein. The views expressed in this Essay do not necessarily reflect the
views of Orrick.
***
Nyah Berg directs New York Appleseed’s Integrated Schools Project.
****
Lauren Webb is an attorney based in New York City. She began working with New
York Appleseed while working as an Associate at Orrick.
**

475

476

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

and others for far too long. The effort to desegregate the schools has
been led not by courtroom lawyers but by advocates and a private law
firm engaged in community building and legal advocacy with
compelling results. That nearly ten-year effort has already paid clear
dividends. By the summer of 2019, there was widespread consensus
that school integration was one of the most important challenges facing
the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE). Both
Mayor Bill de Blasio and Chancellor of Schools Richard Carranza were
under significant scrutiny to determine how they would respond to a
new task force report proposing bold actions to address the problem.
Yet only seven years prior, despite heightened levels of segregation,
integration was rarely discussed as a solution to educational inequality
in the New York City school system. In a rare exception, a 2012 New
York Times piece blithely concluded that integration efforts in prior
decades had failed to achieve results. 1 The dominant mode of
education advocacy was addressing resource disparities caused by
segregation. What happened in the intervening years was neither a
spontaneous burst of advocacy by community members affected by
school segregation nor a unilateral action by professional legal
advocates, but a complex interplay between the two types of advocacy.
Through a critical examination of our work at the nonprofit
organization New York Appleseed (Appleseed) and the global law
firm Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Orrick) in New York City
over a nearly ten-year period from 2011 to 2020, this Essay explains the
role that advocates with legal training played and makes the case that
legal advocates can and should utilize this successful playbook without
involving what is often a regressive court system to build a path for the
most effective advocacy in the future.2
Part I provides a brief history of school integration in the United
States and New York, emphasizing federal caselaw that both
constrained and sometimes enabled our work. Part II describes our
process for framing a role for legal advocacy in response to this history,
local circumstances in New York City, and ethical and strategic

1. See Ford Fessenden, A Portrait of Segregation in New York City’s Schools,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
11,
2012),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/11/nyregion/segreg
ation-in-new-york-city-public-schools.html [https://perma.cc/5NC5-CG8Y].
2. This Essay refers to Appleseed as a “legal organization” because of its founding
by attorneys and its orientation towards law and policy; it refers to its Executive
Director David Tipson as a “legal advocate” because of his legal training. Appleseed,
however, does not represent clients of any kind, and Tipson, though a member of the
bar in other jurisdictions and a member of the New York City Bar Association, was
not licensed in New York during these events.
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considerations. Part III studies our implementation of that role
starting in 2011 when school integration infrequently figured in the
public education debate in New York City. Drawing on news articles,
published reports, and the Authors’ records, this Essay examines the
ways in which advocates used legal training and legal analysis to (1)
seed the reform movement in the early years, (2) break down initial
institutional resistance, and (3) support community stakeholders
joining the movement — all without resorting to litigation. In the
process, this Essay situates Appleseed and Orrick’s work in (and in
some cases distinguishes it from) the current theory and practice of
“community lawyering.”
Part IV reflects on the Authors’ work and its possible lessons for
other legal advocates working on school integration and other social
justice issues. While other law journal articles have focused on
litigation’s impact on school integration, there has been insufficient
and even scant attention paid to advocacy focused on the
administrative state and the role lawyers can play in such movements.
This Essay challenges conventional wisdom around the proper role of
lawyers in supporting movements for social change and argues for a
broader definition of “legal advocacy.” Our experiences suggest that
lawyers and those with legal training must bring the same range of
modes and skills to social movements that they do to their paying
clients (who typically avoid litigation because of its excessive cost and
delay), including an ability to work within existing legislative and
administrative frameworks and with other institutions and
organizations.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. School Desegregation in the United States

For the first half of the twentieth century, the reigning doctrine in
the United States school system was Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but
equal,” which allowed for the racial division of all public facilities.3 But
in 1954, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,4 the United States took the first major step towards school

3. See 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Seven years before Brown, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the creation of segregated schools for students
of Mexican ancestry violated California law and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Mendez v. Westminster School District, 161 F.2d 774 (9th
Cir. 1947) (en banc).
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desegregation. 5 Brown began as a class action lawsuit against the
Topeka Board of Education by named plaintiff Oliver Brown, a Black
man whose daughter was denied entrance to Topeka’s all-white
elementary schools.6 Represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (LDF), including lead counsel (and future Supreme
Court Justice) Thurgood Marshall, Brown successfully argued that
schools for Black children were not equal to schools for white children
and that school segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 One year later, the Supreme Court revisited
the question of relief and further ordered that schools be desegregated
“with all deliberate speed,” although it remanded the case to the
district courts to determine whether such speed was being achieved.8
The Supreme Court in Brown purported to abolish “separate but
equal,” and in the wake of that decision, various states, including
Kansas, began desegregating their public schools. 9 But when “all
deliberate speed” met racist and indignant public opinion, the result
was massive resistance by Southern states. In Virginia, Senator Harry
Byrd opted to close schools instead of desegregating them.10 Alabama
Governor George Wallace physically blocked Black students from
enrolling at the University of Alabama.11 In Mississippi, a member of
the White Citizens Council and Ku Klux Klan murdered Medgar
Evers, who was suing to desegregate Jackson’s schools. 12 And in
Arkansas, Governor Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National

5. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
6. See Harrison Smith & Ellie Silverman, Linda Brown Thompson, Girl at Center
of Brown v. Board of Education Case, Dies, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/linda-brown-young-girl-at-center-of
-brown-v-board-segregation-case-dies-at-76/2018/03/26/2406d6d8-3138-11e8-8abc-22a
366b72f2d_story.html [https://perma.cc/K2D4-D4PV].
7. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
8. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
9. See, e.g., Court Ruling Hailed: Segregation Already Ending Here, Say School
Officials, TOPEKA ST. J. (May 17, 1954), https://www.kansasmemory.org/item/415
[https://perma.cc/G9KR-YXEE] (“Supt. Wendell Godwin said: ‘This action will have
no effect upon Topeka schools because segregation already is being terminated in an
orderly manner.’”).
10. See Ronald L. Heinemann, Harry F. Byrd (1887–1966), ENCYC. VA. (Feb. 12,
2008),
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/byrd_harry_flood_sr_1887-1966
[https://perma.cc/B9HP-XPJ7].
11. See This Day in History, January 14: George Wallace Inaugurated as Alabama
HISTORY
(Jan.
13,
2020),
Governor,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/george-wallace-inaugurated-as-alabama-g
overnor [https://perma.cc/GKG9-8JRP].
12. See generally MICHAEL V. WILLIAMS, MEDGAR EVERS: MISSISSIPPI MARTYR
(2011).
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Guard to block Black students from entering Little Rock Central High
School, leading to a standoff against President Dwight Eisenhower’s
federal troops.13
By 1968, the Supreme Court was losing patience with the slow pace
of school integration across the South. In Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County, 14 the Court reviewed a challenge to a
“freedom-of-choice” plan supposedly designed to integrate formerly
segregated schools. Only 15% of Black students transferred to the
formerly white school, and no white students transferred to the
formerly Black school.15 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court
recognized that the district needed to actively remove disparities
between schools in order to remove the “dual system” that segregation
had brought into being.16 The Court announced an “affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch.”17 The Court also listed several factors to evaluate whether
schools were truly integrated: (1) school administration, (2) the
physical condition of the school, (3) transportation and busing, (4)
personnel and faculty, (5) revision of districts and attendance areas,
and (6) revision of local laws and regulations.18
Green’s emphasis on eliminating disparities within a “dual system”
opened the door to a wave of desegregation cases in northern cities
where there had been no prior laws explicitly requiring racial
segregation in school enrollment. 19 The first of these to reach the
Supreme Court was Keyes v. School District.20 In that case, the Court
clarified that even school districts without a history of legally mandated
racial segregation throughout the district could be subject to

13. See This Day in History, September 25: Little Rock Nine Begin First Full Day
HISTORY
(Sept.
23,
2020),
Classes,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/central-high-school-integrated
[https://perma.cc/F6WW-65FP].
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
15. See Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Braxton, 402 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968); H.R.J. Res.
353, 2008 Sess. (Va. 2008).
16. See Green, 391 U.S. 430.
17. Id. at 437–38.
18. See id. at 436.
19. See Will Stancil, The Radical Supreme Court Decision That America Forgot,
ATLANTIC
(May
29,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/the-radical-supreme-court-dec
ision-that-america-forgot/561410/ [https://perma.cc/GVV5-D4XL].
20. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

of
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desegregation orders if the school board’s segregative action has been
proven with respect to a portion of the school system.21
Northern officials who opposed federal desegregation efforts also
began using school district boundary lines to perpetuate the status quo
— injecting money into new, suburban schools that effectively
prohibited Black attendance by drawing district boundary lines
consistent with segregated housing patterns. 22 The Court addressed
this conduct in Milliken v. Bradley,23 which arose two decades after the
Brown decision. Milliken’s landscape was metropolitan Detroit, where
at the time, almost two-thirds of city students were Black, while nearly
all students in the growing suburban localities were white.24 Milliken’s
class action plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Detroit’s school districting
policies amounted to segregation and thereby violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 25 The district court held that the government’s
actions established and maintained a pattern of residential segregation
throughout Detroit and devised a remedial plan that created clusters
of schools across Detroit’s school districts.26 Without such a plan, the
court reasoned, Detroit would end up with a central, city school system
educating mostly Black students, surrounded by a suburban ring of
mostly white school districts.27 The court of appeals affirmed, but the
Supreme Court voted 5–4 to overturn, holding that remedial efforts
could not cross district boundaries unless the Detroit School Board
committed unconstitutional actions that had a segregative impact on
other districts, or the segregated condition of the relevant schools must
itself have been influenced by segregative practices in the surrounding
districts into which the remedy would extend.28 Where there were no
such actions or practices, district lines would confine future remedial
efforts.29

21. See id. at 210.
22. See Elissa Nadworny & Cory Turner, This Supreme Court Case Made School
District Lines a Tool for Segregation, NPR (July 25, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/25/739493839/this-supreme-court-case-made-school-distr
ict-lines-a-tool-for-segregation [https://perma.cc/AL7M-NE9S].
23. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
24. See id.; see also Nadworny & Turner, supra note 22.
25. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 721–23.
26. See id. at 724–25.
27. See id. at 724–27.
28. See id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
29. See id.
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Justice Thurgood Marshall, who joined the bench in 1967,30 issued a
scathing dissent, characterizing Milliken’s majority opinion as an
“emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws.” 31 Justice Marshall argued that if a plan focused on
desegregating only Detroit and excluded its surrounding suburbs,
schools would remain segregated, and “[t]he very evil that Brown I was
aimed at will not be cured, but will be perpetuated.”32 Justices William
O. Douglas, William J. Brennan Jr., and Byron White joined in Justice
Marshall’s dissent, with two of the Justices also writing dissents of their
own. 33 But the majority had spoken, and to the dismay of many,
Congress did not intervene.34
Despite decades of criticism,35 Milliken remains the law today, and
inter-district segregation is the rule in most U.S. metropolitan areas.
More than half of U.S. schoolchildren are in school districts where over

30. See Fred P. Graham, Senate Confirms Marshall As the First Negro Justice; 10
Southerners Oppose High Court Nominee in 69-to-11 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31,

1967),
https://www.nytimes.com/1967/08/31/archives/senate-confirms-marshall-as-the-first-n
egro-justice-10-southerners.html [https://perma.cc/J529-HH68].
31. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 802.
33. Justice Douglas argued that permitting segregation through district creation
allowed “the State [to] wash[] its hands of its own creations.” Id. at 757–62 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice White argued that in the wake of Milliken’s majority
opinion, “deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go unremedied,
not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable . . . but because an effective
remedy would cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative
inconvenience to the State.” Id. at 762 (White, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 724–30 (majority opinion); Relationship of Milliken and Sheff
Decisions,
OFF.
LEGIS.
RSCH.
(July
21,
1998),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/PS98/rpt%5Colr%5Chtm/98-R-0907.htm
[https://perma.cc/K9CJ-A7ML] (stating that “[t]he Milliken decision not only set the
standard for subsequent federal school desegregation cases for which a interdistrict
remedy was sought, but it was codified in a federal statute,” namely 20 U.S.C. § 1756).
35. See, e.g., Brown at 60 and Milliken at 40: A Collection of Essays from People
Involved in and Affected by the Most Pivotal Court Decisions Related to Education,
HARV.
ED.
MAG.
(2014),
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/14/06/brown-60-milliken-40
[https://perma.cc/U9RP-KA35]; see also Rebekah Enoch, Baugh: The Detroit School
Busing Case: A Failure of Public Leadership, TRUMAN SCHOLARS ASSN. (Feb. 28,
2011),
https://trumanscholars.org/status-update/baugh-the-detroit-school-busing-case-a-failu
re-of-public-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/Q2AR-PYAG] (noting that “Gary Orfield,
Director of the Harvard Project on School Desegregation and a leading expert on this
issue, argued that Milliken ‘rendered Brown almost meaningless for most of the
metropolitan North by blocking desegregation plans that would integrate cities with
their suburbs’ and ‘lock[ed] millions of minority schoolchildren into inferior, isolated
schools’” (alteration in original)).
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75% of students are either white or nonwhite.36 But the mechanisms
that keep these schools segregated overpower the voices of educators,
parents, and students who wish to change them, leaving lawyers and
legislatures to pick up the pieces.37
Due to decades of policy-driven “white flight” from cities to suburbs
and exclusionary policies that trapped Black and Latino people in the
cities that whites had abandoned, the Milliken decisions effectively
prevented meaningful school desegregation across northern
metropolitan regions. 38 By the late 1970s, there were simply not
enough white children in most northern city school districts to make
integration feasible.39 The most notable exception to this pattern was
New York City.40
Over the next 30 years, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
increasingly sought to end the involvement of the federal courts in
school integration, yet some school districts began adopting integration
plans even when not ordered to do so by federal courts. Capping off
its general trend, the Court in 2007 severely limited school districts’
discretion to promote racial integration voluntarily in K–12 schools.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 41

presented a major new challenge for integration advocates. In this
decision, the Court struck down two voluntary integration programs

36. See Nonwhite School Districts Get $23 Billion Less Than White Districts
Despite
Serving
the
Same
Number
of
Students,
EDBUILD,

https://edbuild.org/content/23-billion#CA
[https://perma.cc/RY6X-BGXC]
(last
visited Oct. 13, 2020).
37. See, e.g., Will Stancil, School Segregation Is Not a Myth, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/03/school-segregation-is-not-a-m
yth/555614 [https://perma.cc/7LWE-RTBN] (“Dedicated advocates and smart
policymakers can thwart school resegregation, and eventually reverse it. But it will not
reverse itself.”); see also Krista Kauble, Comment, Litigating Keyes: The New
Opportunity for Litigators to Achieve Desegregation, 31 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV.
103 (2012) (discussing opportunities for lawyers to meaningfully involve themselves in
desegregation efforts).
38. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2018).
39. See, e.g., John R. Logan, Deirdre Oakley & Jacob Stowell, School Segregation

in Metropolitan Regions, 1970–2000: The Impacts of Policy Choices on Public
Education, 113 AJS 1611 (2008).
40. See, e.g., Eliza Shapiro, Segregation Has Been the Story of New York City’s
Schools
for
50
Years,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/nyregion/school-segregation-new-york.html
[https://perma.cc/NK99-4PP3] (noting that “[i]n the 1970s, the specialized schools were
overwhelmingly white”).
41. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. (PICS), 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
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implemented in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky. The
Seattle program permitted students to select any school in the district,
but if schools were oversubscribed, the district would use the racial
composition of the school’s student body as a tiebreaker for school
admissions; if the school’s student body deviated significantly from the
racial composition of all students in Seattle (approximately 60%
nonwhite and 40% white), then students of the overly represented
group would not be admitted. 42 Similarly, the Louisville program
rejected applicants if that school had reached the “extremes of the
racial guidelines” (meaning Black enrollment of less than 15% or
higher than 50%), and such students would further contribute to the
racial imbalance.43
A majority of the Court (five Justices) applied strict scrutiny to the
cases and held that both plans were unconstitutional because they were
not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 44 Justice Anthony Kennedy,
however, specifically refused to join portions of the plurality opinion
that found no compelling governmental interest to justify either of the
two plans. Rather, he recognized compelling interests in “avoiding
racial isolation” and “achiev[ing] a diverse student population. Race
may be one component of that diversity” — a small, but significant,
point of overlap with the four dissenting Justices.45 Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence with the majority rested on a belief that the districts could
have achieved such goals through more narrowly tailored means.46 He
listed specific actions that school districts could take in pursuance of
school diversity that would be unlikely to trigger strict scrutiny, stating
that “[s]chool boards may pursue . . . strategic site selection of new
schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion.”47
Although PICS did not go so far as to ban all consideration of race
in K–12 student-enrollment policies completely, the ruling prompted
many states and districts across the country to scale back or eliminate
efforts to pursue racially integrated student bodies. 48 The U.S.
42. See id. at 710–14.
43. See id. at 716; id. 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. 817–18 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
44. See id. at 720–25 (majority opinion).
45. See id. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 783–87.
47. Id. at 789.
48. See Erica Frankenberg et al., The New Politics of Diversity: Lessons from a
Federal Technical Assistance Grant, 53 AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 440, 442; see also Tamar
Lewin, Across U.S., a New Look at School Integration Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
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Department of Education intensified the chilling effect on local
governments when it released, under President George W. Bush, a
“Dear Colleague” letter with an extremely narrow and arguably
misleading interpretation of PICS, suggesting that there was little
school districts could lawfully do to pursue racial integration.49
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, in recognizing the compelling interest of
reducing racial segregation in schools, acknowledged the value of “an
integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its
children.” 50 Justice Breyer, in his dissent, also highlighted the
importance of integrated schools in “overcoming the adverse
educational effects produced by and associated with highly segregated
schools,”51 a relationship that has been borne out through research.
Throughout America’s history, an “opportunity gap” in academic
outcomes 52 between Black, Hispanic, and white students has
persisted. 53 The opportunity gap is attributed to a multitude of
discriminatory practices that are often consequences of segregation —

2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/washington/29schools.html?searchResultPositio
n=86 [https://perma.cc/4WR5-AFC5] (describing school districts considering other
methods by which to achieve diversity).
49. See Letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Sec’y for C.R., U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., to Colleague (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter],
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/raceassignmentese.html
[https://perma.cc/MCL7-EEHZ] (“The Department of Education strongly encourages
the use of race-neutral methods for assigning students to elementary and secondary
schools. Unlike the assignment plans in Parents Involved, genuinely race-neutral
measures — for instance, those truly based on socio-economic status — do not trigger
strict scrutiny and are instead subject to the rational-basis standard applicable to
general social and economic legislation.”).
50. PICS, 551 U.S. at 797.
51. Id. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. In this Essay, the Authors have chosen to use the phrase “opportunity gap” to
describe the gap in test scores and educational outcomes that are typically experienced
by students of color (when compared to white students) and students of lower
socioeconomic status (when compared to wealthier students). Although much of the
social science literature uses “achievement gap” to describe these issues, we feel that
“opportunity gap” better captures that these discrepancies result from differences in
the opportunities given to these students, rather than differences in ability. When
describing conclusions of or quoting from articles that use “achievement gap,” the
Authors continue to use that phrase in the footnotes.
53. See Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps, STAN. CTR. FOR EDUC. POL’Y
ANALYSIS,
https://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunity-monitoring-project/achievement-g
aps/race/ [https://perma.cc/PL9S-HU32] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020) (finding that the
nationwide white-Black and white-Hispanic achievement gaps, based on National
Assessment of Educational Progress test scores, range from 0.5 to 0.9 standard
deviations and noting that the gaps vary at the state level, with many states
experiencing gaps larger than 1.0 standard deviation).

2021] EFFECTIVE SCHOOL-INTEGRATION MOBILIZATION 485
lack of resources at segregated schools attended by predominantly
nonwhite students, academic tracking within schools, and
discriminatory discipline practices — as well as some external factors
— parents’ economic resources and educational background. 54 The
effects of the opportunity gap compound over the lives of the students,
making it more challenging for nonwhite students to obtain prestigious
degrees and high-paying jobs and accrue wealth over time,55 therefore
contributing to the racial wealth gap. Despite the persistence of the
continuing consequences of segregation, the opportunity gap is not
inevitable. Black and white students narrowed the opportunity gap (as
measured by test scores and dropout rates) significantly during the
peak of desegregation efforts, although the gap widened in the 1980s
and 1990s as desegregation efforts stalled, indicating that school
integration is one of many steps that societies should take to reduce the
gap.56
Racially and socioeconomically integrated schools are a necessary
component of creating a more equitable society with opportunities for
students of all backgrounds. Two decades of research have shown that

54. See Carrie Spector, Racial Disparities in School Discipline Are Linked to the
Achievement Gap Between Black and White Students Nationwide, According to
Stanford-Led Study, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. EDUCATION (Oct. 16, 2019),

https://ed.stanford.edu/news/racial-disparities-school-discipline-are-linked-achieveme
nt-gap-between-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/X2PY-VBK9]; What Explains
White-Black Differences in Average Test Scores?, EDUC. OPPORTUNITY PROJECT
STAN. UNIV., https://edopportunity.org/discoveries/white-black-differences-scores/
[https://perma.cc/D4AS-7KFT] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020) (“Our research suggests that
the most important predictor of achievement gaps is school segregation. This is readily
evident in the data . . . . If it is possible to provide equal educational opportunity under
conditions of segregation, no community in the U.S. has discovered the way.”).
55. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education,
INST.
(Mar.
1,
1998),
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-education/
[https://perma.cc/R7PK-WZES].
56. See GARY ORFIELD, C.R. PROJECT, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE:
CONSEQUENCES
OF
A
DECADE
OF
RESEGREGATION
10
(2001),
https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/sc
hools-more-separate-consequences-of-a-decade-of-resegregation/orfield-schools-mor
e-separate-2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H9U-56PU]; Roslyn Arlin Mickelson,

Twenty-First Century Social Science Research on School Diversity and Educational
Outcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173, 1203–05, 1215–17 (2008) (finding that high school

dropout rates for Black students were reduced in the 1970s and 1980s, “the decades
when desegregation policies were pursued most actively,” and were reduced to the
greatest magnitude in the school districts with the greatest declines in school
segregation and that the “[B]lack-white gap in reaching achievement is significantly
smaller in schools with between 25% and 54% [B]lack, Hispanic, and Native-American
students”); What Explains White-Black Differences in Average Test Scores?, supra
note 54.
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the integration of schools not only results in academic but also
socioemotional gains. 57 For example, researchers have found that
students of all races and socioeconomic status attending racially,
ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse schools tend to have higher
achievement in math, science, language, and reading, with the greatest
benefits accruing to students in middle and high school.58 Research has
also shown that diverse schools “prepar[e] students to live in a
multicultural society — particularly in terms of promoting interracial
understanding and comfort, friendship building, and fostering civic and
democratic engagement.”59 These benefits similarly accrue to students
of all racial and ethnic groups and include “lower likelihood of
involvement with the criminal justice system” and an increased
likelihood of choosing to live and work in integrated environments in
the future.60 Interactions between students of different races in schools
create the opportunity for them to develop interracial friendships,
which, studies have shown, reduce “intergroup anxiety” experienced
by students when interacting with individuals of a different race, 61
reduce individual levels of racial prejudice and stereotyping, and
increase self-confidence, civic development, and commitment to racial
equity for all students involved in interracial friendships. 62 The
well-documented benefits of integration do not inure to the benefit of
children who attend school in segregated classrooms.

57. See Mickelson, supra note 56, at 1173–216 (noting that most studies have found
that segregation has a negative impact on nonwhite students’ achievement).
58. See ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON, NAT’L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, SCHOOL
INTEGRATION AND K–12 OUTCOMES: AN UPDATED QUICK SYNTHESIS OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCE
EVIDENCE
1–2
nn.4–10
(2016),
https://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25VF-NU3Q]; see also Mickelson, supra note 56, at 1173–216.
59. MICHAEL A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY: SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC
PARTICIPATION 146 (2018).
60. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Mokubung Nkomo & George L. Wimberly,

Integrated Schooling, Life Course Outcomes, and Social Cohesion in Multiethnic
Democratic Societies, 36 REV. RSCH. EDUCATION 197, 208; see also REBELL, supra
note 59, at 60.
61. See Kristin Davies et al., Cross-Group Friendships and Intergroup Attitudes:
A Meta-Analytic Review, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 332, 333 (2011) (citing
Shana Levin, Colette van Laar & Jim Sidanius, The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup
Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Longitudinal Study, 6 GRP. PROCESSES
& INTERGROUP RELS. 76 (2003)); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student
Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 751 (1998).
62. See Mitchell J. Chang et al., The Educational Benefits of Sustaining
Cross-Racial Interaction Among Undergraduates, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 430, 432
(2006); see also Mickelson et al., supra note 60, at 209, 217–19 (finding that students
who attended racially and ethnically diverse schools “were more likely to prefer to live
and work in diverse settings as adults”).
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B. School Integration in New York City

The history of segregation in New York traced that of the rest of the
United States. A few years after Plessy, the New York State Court of
Appeals held that a state law providing separate schools for “colored”
children was constitutional so long as the State provided facilities equal
to those for white children.63
The statute authorizing separate schools for Black students was
repealed in 1938, 64 but school segregation persisted. 65 Black and
Puerto Rican people migrating to New York City in the twentieth
century arrived to pervasive housing discrimination confining them to
certain neighborhoods and excluding them from others. 66
Student-assignment policies mirrored this segregation by encouraging
students to attend schools within their neighborhoods. 67 In 1954,
during a conversation with a Harlem audience about schools populated
entirely by Black students, the President of New York’s Board of
Education (the Board), Arthur Levitt, attributed school segregation to
housing discrimination and segregated communities, rather than
governmental action or inaction.68 Levitt argued that there was “no
segregation in schools deliberately imposed by legislation.”69
Meanwhile, New York City Superintendent of Schools, William
Jansen, insisted that the State’s school system was already properly
integrated and resisted calls for additional remedial measures.70 The
Board was similarly ineffectual, carrying out poorly planned
integration attempts in the late 1950s before finding itself embroiled in
a corruption scandal in 1961. 71 And while ideas for desegregation

63. See People ex rel. Cisco v. Sch. Bd. of Borough of Queens, 56 N.E. 81 (N.Y.
1900); see also JOHN KUCSERA & GARY ORFIELD, C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO
DERECHOS CIVILES, NEW YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION:
INEQUALITY,
INACTION
AND
A
DAMAGED
FUTURE
13
(2014),
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diver
sity/ny-norflet-report-placeholder/Kucsera-New-York-Extreme-Segregation-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97MC-SACD].
64. See KUCSERA & ORFIELD, supra note 63, at 13.
65. Until 1957, there was no ethnic census of the New York City school system as
a whole, or even of individual schools. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL
WARS: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 251 (2000).
66. For a description of policies and practices by whites that restricted where Black
people could live in New York City and other northern cities, see generally ISABEL
WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS (2011).
67. See RAVITCH, supra note 65, at 251–52, 257.
68. See id. at 252.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 255.
71. See id. at 255–65.
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continued to float around, none seemed to take hold. One of these
ideas was busing — the practice of assigning and transporting students
to schools beyond New York City’s attendance zones to alleviate
segregation. 72 In New York City, busing would entail transferring
students from predominantly Black and Puerto Rican schools to
predominantly white schools, and white students to predominantly
Black and Puerto Rican schools.73 This two-way plan was designed to
integrate schools in both districts while avoiding the overcrowding and
underutilization that might result from one-way transfers. Many white
parents vehemently opposed this idea and even sued to prevent it from
taking place.74 But as civil rights leaders joined the fight to improve
New York’s school system, busing became a pivotal component of their
desegregation planning.75
Civil rights leaders negotiated with the Board between 1963 and
1964, repeatedly threatening boycotts if no serious desegregation plan
was put in place. 76 But in February 1964, after several half-hearted
integration proposals from the Board, the leaders decided that enough
was enough. They staged picketing at 300 of New York’s 860 public
schools, with nearly 45% of New York students out of school that day
and thousands of demonstrators marching to the Board headquarters
to demand integration.77 It was the largest civil rights protest in New
York City’s history, but little came of it, or of the second, smaller
boycott that leaders organized on March 16. 78 Aside from gestures
toward integration following these demonstrations, 79 the Board’s

72. See Marie Lily Cerat & Whitney Hollins, An Integration Plan That Never Was:
Looking for Brown v. Board of Education in the Board’s 1954 Commission on
Integration,
THEORY
RSCH.
&
ACTION
IN
URB.
EDUC.,

https://traue.commons.gc.cuny.edu/volume-iii-issue-1-fall-2014/integration-plan-never
-looking-brown-v-board-education-new-york-city-board-educations-1954-commission
-integration/ [https://perma.cc/DS3C-TX96] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (describing
early debates in New York City about using bus transportation to reduce segregation
in schools).
73. See MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
NATIONAL RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 24 (2016).
74. See RAVITCH, supra note 65, at 271.
75. See id. at 273 (“Galamison said that while bussing was only one way of
achieving integration, ‘anyone who talks about integration and is against bussing is not
serious about the matter.’”).
76. See id. at 269–76.
77. See id. at 276.
78. See id. at 276–79; see also Yasmeen Khan, Demand for School Integration
Leads to Massive 1964 Boycott — In New York City, WNYC (Feb. 3, 2016),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/school-boycott-1964 [https://perma.cc/2TLS-2BEF].
79. For example, State Commissioner of Education James Allen, Jr. released a
comprehensive integration report at the Board’s request, and Superintendent of
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proposals did not include any programs advanced by advocates that
were expected to ignite significant pushback from white parents.80
By 1977, New York City faced “white flight” out of the city and
school system at such stark levels that the Board projected that the
white student population would drop to 14% of the total within ten
years.81 Many felt that it was too late for a citywide integration plan.82
The courts did not provide effective recourse for racial segregation
either; a few individual schools and nearby districts were placed under
desegregation court orders,83 but New York City was never subject to
a citywide desegregation order.84
C. Status Quo in 2011

A 2014 report by UCLA’s Center for Civil Rights found that
between 1989 and 2011, the percentage of schools in the New York City
metro area in which “minority” students made up 90%–100% of the
student body increased from 27.3% to 46.4%; the percentage of schools

Schools Calvin Gross drafted a partial integration plan in collaboration with civil rights
leaders. See RAVITCH, supra note 65, at 280–86.
80. See, e.g., id. at 284 (“[T]he Allen Report undermined support for most of the
programs that integrationists had been fighting for. While accepting the neighborhood
primary school, the report rejected bussing, enforced transfers, pairings, or any other
program that was not mutually acceptable to both minority groups and whites.”); id. at
286 (“It became apparent why Gross lost the support of the civil rights groups: the plan
included no compulsory assignment of whites to Negro schools, no new pairings, and
no junior high school zoning changes.”).
81. See Lesley Oelsner, If New York City Is Lagging on School Integration Now,
What
About
the
Future?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
1977),
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/21/archives/if-new-york-city-is-lagging-on-school-in
tegration-now-what-about.html [https://perma.cc/HP9V-ZDT5].
82. For example, former Deputy Chancellor Bernard Gifford. See id.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538, 1541
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) (mandating a desegregation plan
including the creation of magnet schools and implementation of an assignment
program and requiring a court-appointed monitor); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that Yonkers illegally and
intentionally segregated the city’s public schools and public housing along racial lines);
Jennifer Medina, Desegregation Order Lifted from a School in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/nyregion/23school.html
[https://perma.cc/2GNU-CDHL] (describing the end, in 2008, of a desegregation order
that had been imposed on Mark Twain Intermediate School in District No. 21 in 1974).
84. See C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES, NEW YORK STATE’S
EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY, INACTION AND A DAMAGED FUTURE
2 (2014) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION],
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diver
sity/ny-norflet-report-placeholder/NYmetro_NY_CBSA_intrastate_tables_2014_Mar
ch21_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZK4-TRWR].
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in which “minority” students85 made up 50%–100% of the student body
increased from 45.4% to 65.9%. 86 In contrast, the number of
“multi-racial schools,” defined as schools in which any three races
(categorized in the study as white, Black, Latino, American Indian, and
Asian) represent “10% or more of the total student enrollment
respectively,” only increased by two percentage points: from 25.1%
during the 1989–1990 school year to 27.4% during the 2010–2011 school
year. 87 This increase in school segregation was both the result of
choices by individual parents to oppose integration or leave the New
York City schools for the suburbs or private schools, as well as a failure
by policymakers to prioritize school integration after the failed fights
of the 1960s.88
The situation worsened in New York City through the 2000s, as
“education reform” advocates placed their focus on accountability
efforts and choice-focused policies that ignored issues of race and
poverty. In 2002, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg took
office and implemented an “education reform” program under
Chancellor Joel Klein that focused on increasing “school choice,”
teacher and school accountability based on testing, and charter
schools.89 Integration, by contrast, “was generally not a priority of the
Bloomberg administration.”90

85. The report defines “minority” as “[B]lack, Latino, American Indian, Asian,
Pacific Islander, and multi-racial students.” KUCSERA & ORFIELD, supra note 63, at vi
n.4. “The use of ‘minority’ to describe non-whites has decreased in popularity and has
been increasingly replaced with ‘people of color.’” Daniel Blake, The Case for
Rebranding Minority-Serving Institutions, DIVERSE: ISSUES HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 17,
2017), https://diverseeducation.com/article/91247/ [https://perma.cc/ZSP7-XHZG].
Furthermore, whites now represent a minority of K–12 students in the United States.
See Grace Chen, White Students Are Now the Minority in U.S. Public Schools, PUB.
SCH.
REV.
(Oct.
14,
2019),
https://www.publicschoolreview.com/blog/white-students-are-now-the-minority-in-u-s
-public-schools [https://perma.cc/J7TE-XU5Z].
86. See NEW YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION, supra note 84, at 2.
87. See id. at 2–3.
88. See generally KUCSERA & ORFIELD, supra note 63.
89. See Valerie Strauss, Mike Bloomberg Was in Charge of the Country’s Largest
Public School District. Here Are 8 Key Questions for Him., WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2020,
8:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/02/25/mike-bloomberg-was-charge-c
ountrys-largest-public-school-district-here-are-8-key-questions-him/
[https://perma.cc/Y9GR-KTPT].
90. Matt Barnum, Michael Bloomberg Is Running for President on His Education
Record. Here’s What Research Found About Those Policies., CHALKBEAT (Feb. 25,
2020,
8:10
PM),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/2020/2/25/21178652/michael-bloomberg-is-running-for-pre
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The proliferation of charter schools and other forms of unmanaged
school choice under the Bloomberg Administration 91 likely
exacerbated segregation.92 One study of enrollment data from 2006 to
2016 found that school-choice policies allow affluent, privileged, and
disproportionally white families to navigate the system to their
advantage and hoard resources and opportunity: “White
families . . . tended to choose schools that have more White children
than their zoned schools do. Black and Hispanic families, on the other
hand, [chose] schools with the same proportion of Black and Hispanic
children as the schools to which they were zoned.”93 In a 2013 policy
briefing, Appleseed wrote, “[p]ut starkly, New York City’s hybrid
system allows parents with means to flee schools they don’t like even
as it excludes others from the schools that affluent parents do like.”94
Similar issues emerged from the Bloomberg Administration’s
emphasis on increasing the use of selective schools with competitive
admissions processes. In 2002, only 15.8% of school programs screened
in this way.95 By 2009, it was 28.4%, even though as early as 1986, a
task force convened by the New York City Chancellor of Schools to

sident-on-his-education-record-here-s-what-research-found-about
[https://perma.cc/24YF-CFVQ].
91. See, e.g., GROVER J. WHITEHURST & SARAH WHITFIELD, BROWN CTR. ON
EDUC. POL’Y AT BROOKINGS, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN THE
NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS — WILL THE PAST BE PROLOGUE? 4–5 (2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/School-Choice-and-School-P
erformance-in-NYC-Public-Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R2N-DEHB] (analyzing
the expansion of school choice under the Bloomberg Administration).
92. See KUCSERA & ORFIELD, supra note 63, at viii; see also supra notes 82–84 and
accompanying text (describing an increase in racially segregated schools from 1989
through 2011).
93. NICOLE MADER ET AL., CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFS., THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:
HOW SCHOOL CHOICE DIVIDES NEW YORK CITY ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 17 (2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/5aecb1c3352f537d
3541623b/1525461450469/The+Paradox+of+Choice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8Q7-ELX2].
94. N.Y. APPLESEED, WITHIN OUR REACH: SEGREGATION IN NYC DISTRICT
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: SCHOOL-TO-SCHOOL
DIVERSITY 11 (2013) [hereinafter WITHIN OUR REACH: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 2013],
https://nyappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/First-Briefing-FINAL-with-Essential-Str
ategies-8_5_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP5P-EVR3]. This insight was corroborated with
quantitative data from the Center for New York City Affairs. See MADER ET AL., supra
note 93, at 18–22.
95. Monica Disare, Great Divide: How Extreme Academic Segregation Isolates
Students in New York City’s High Schools, CHALKBEAT (Dec. 19, 2016, 6:00 AM),
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2016/12/19/21103651/great-divide-how-extreme-academic-seg
regation-isolates-students-in-new-york-city-s-high-schools
[https://perma.cc/C6U2-DM2H].
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improve school quality and access warned against this problem.96 The
task force was particularly wary of screening methods like interviews,
tests developed by schools, and admissions preferences for those who
attend open houses, and cautioned people to avoid “invalid and/or
biased admissions criteria.”97
Attendance at screened high school programs also falls along racial
lines. In 2011, The New York Times noted that in the entering high
school class, only 7% of freshmen admitted to “the most selective
schools” using an exam as admissions criteria were Black and only 8%
were Hispanic, despite the fact that Black and Hispanic students made
up approximately 30% and 39%, respectively, of applicants in New
York City that year.98 The numbers were closer to representative in
“the most selective schools” using minimum grades or state test scores,
in which Black and Hispanic students made up 27% and 34%,
respectively, of students admitted.99 Black and Hispanic students were
most represented, however, in “unselective schools,” in which they
made up 41% and 48% (in schools requiring “only a visit”) and 34%
and 47% (in schools “accept[ing] all academic levels”).100
Analyzing data from the 2001–2002 to 2010–2011 school years,
Appleseed concluded that the already high levels of segregation for
Latino and white students had not improved during the Bloomberg
years and that racial isolation for Asian students at all school levels and
for Black high school students had actually increased.101 By the end of
the Bloomberg Administration, New York City demonstrated aspects
of the “dual system” at issue in Green.102

96. See id.
97. WITHIN OUR REACH: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 2013, supra note 94. This insight
was corroborated with quantitative data from the Center for New York City Affairs.
See MADER ET AL., supra note 93, at 18.
98. See Elizabeth A. Harris & Ford Fessenden, The Broken Promises of Choice in
New
York
City
Schools,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/nyregion/school-choice-new-york-city-high-scho
ol-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/UAE6-2PT3].
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See IBO Data on School Segregation 2001–2010, N.Y. APPLESEED,
https://www.nyappleseed.org/work/ibo-data-school-segregation-2001-2010/
[https://perma.cc/6KAT-52HX] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020) (analyzing data from the
Independent Budget Office).
102. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968); DOUGLAS READY ET AL.,
EDUC. FUNDERS RSCH. INITIATIVE, THE EXPERIENCES OF ONE NEW YORK CITY HIGH
SCHOOL COHORT: OPPORTUNITIES, SUCCESSES, AND CHALLENGES 35 (2013),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED562061.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6G9-J3K3] (“[T]hese
findings suggest that in many ways this one cohort of students experience two different
school systems.”).
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II. FRAMING THE ROLE FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY

Such was the landscape that Appleseed and Orrick entered in 2011.
New York City media and research outlets rarely addressed issues of
school segregation, and when they did, integration was not the
proposed solution. 103 The only approach that could plausibly be
described as an integration initiative — a modest student-assignment
plan in a small community school district on the Lower East Side of
Manhattan — had been terminated by NYCDOE perhaps in
anticipation of the PICS decision. 104 NYCDOE’s hard-nosed “no
excuses” policies under Chancellor Klein and its selective application
of the Bush Administration K–12 “Dear Colleague” guidance made it
impossible for community members to make headway in reinstating
the plan.105
In 2011, New York Appleseed was the New York City office of a
network of nonprofit Appleseed organizations in the United States and
Mexico. Members of the Harvard Law School Class of 1958, led by
Ralph Nader, established the network in 1993 shortly after their 35th
“[R]ather than filing individual lawsuits,” Nader
reunion. 106
envisioned that the new network would “solve problems at their root”
by engaging pro bono lawyers and community stakeholders.107 Author
David Tipson took the helm at New York Appleseed in 2010 after
working as an attorney at the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
103. Exceptions included Richard Kahlenberg, Levelling the School Playing Field:
A Critical Aim for New York’s Future, in FROM DISASTER TO DIVERSITY: WHAT’S
NEXT FOR NEW YORK CITY’S ECONOMY? (2009); Nat Hentoff, Segregation 2010:
Bloomberg’s
Schools,
VILL.
VOICE
(Mar.
24,
2010),

https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/03/24/segregation-2010-bloombergs-schools/
[https://perma.cc/MSP6-8RXD]; Michael Meyers, The Shameful Resegregation of
New York City Schools, N.Y. C.R. COAL., https://nycivilrights.org/688
[https://perma.cc/MX9U-GDTV] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).
104. See N.Y. APPLESEED, WITHIN OUR REACH: SEGREGATION IN NYC DISTRICT
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: 2020 EDITION 10 (2020)
[hereinafter
WITHIN
OUR
REACH:
ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS
2020],
https://www.nyappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/Appleseed-Elementary-School-Bri
efing-Within-Our-Reach-July-2020_V2_REV1-Single-Pages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J7GT-9EP7]; New York Schools Wonder: How White Is Too White?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/nyregion/program-aims-to-keep-schools-diverseas-new-york-neighborhoods-gentrify.html [https://perma.cc/5EPD-2HHQ].
105. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 49.
106. See Saundra Torry, Harvard Law Group Tackles Social Injustice, WASH. POST
(Feb.
18,
1994),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/02/18/harvard-law-group-tackl
es-social-injustice/27412588-f3a1-4f74-8552-69a20586c656/
[https://perma.cc/6PXF-PMWW].
107. Id.
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Under Law in Washington. Tipson had worked under the legendary
civil rights and school desegregation attorney John Brittain and had
served on the team of lawyers developing the Lawyers’ Committee’s
response to PICS in the summer of 2007. Tipson took the position at
Appleseed, hoping to address school segregation in what he knew to
be one of the few northern city school districts with sufficient racial
diversity to make school integration possible without encountering the
barriers presented by Milliken.
In his first year at Appleseed, Tipson put out an open request to law
firms to work with the organization to address school segregation in
New York City. Responding enthusiastically to Appleseed’s request
was Author Rene Kathawala, pro bono counsel at Orrick, and his team
of 15 pro bono attorneys. Kathawala offered Orrick’s assistance on the
condition that the project dedicate itself exclusively to results-driven
advocacy securing actual policy change benefitting New York City
students. Reports, white papers, and analyses would only be useful
insofar as they furthered the goal of achieving long-lasting change to
address structural systems that maintained inequality and fostered
segregation.
Raised eyebrows, chuckles, and friendly admonishments were the
norm when Orrick attorneys began speaking with experts about the
possibility of reviving school integration as a solution to educational
inequality in New York City. The high poverty rate and relatively
small number of white children in the public school system, 108 the
far-flung, archipelagic geography of a city of 8.5 million, the
widespread conventional wisdom that school segregation was simply a
product of neighborhood segregation, and the general sense that the
Supreme Court had precluded school districts from pursuing voluntary
integration strategies all conspired to make integration efforts seem
anachronistic and naïve. Some community organizations indicated that
integration was not a priority for their members and could even be a
distraction from advocacy for equitable distribution of resources across
schools.
At the time, the public debate around education was governed
almost exclusively by the binary politics of “education reform” and the
roles of charter schools and teachers’ unions in particular.
Organizations and individuals became defined as for or against making

108. See N.Y. STATE ASS’N. OF SCH. BUS. OFFS., GROWING STUDENT POVERTY:
CHALLENGES FOR ACHIEVEMENT AND STATE FUNDING
6
(2017),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.asbonewyork.org/resource/resmgr/reports/Growing_Stu
dent_Poverty_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J26N-4L23] (showing that 72% of students
were “economically disadvantaged” or eligible for reduced-price meals).
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it difficult — if not impossible — to engage in policy discussions that
could theoretically advance integration without reference to these
polarized and entrenched camps (and the risk of alienating groups that
opposed them).
But Appleseed and Orrick quickly learned that the objections to
prioritizing integration also suggested their counterarguments:
although neighborhood segregation did in fact present the primary
barrier to school integration, it did not explain the all-too-frequent
incidence of school segregation within diverse community school
districts — a situation notably different from the stark realities of
inter-district segregation at issue in Milliken. 109 School segregation
had actually increased under the Bloomberg Administration 110 — a
fact suggesting that policy played an important role. Although poverty
rates were very high on average across the City, 111 demographics
varied greatly across community school districts, 112 and the City’s
enormous size and fragmented educational geography lent itself well
to initiatives at the community school district level113 — each of these
districts comprised an average population the size of the city of
Buffalo. 114 Additionally, it stood to reason that at least some
individuals on either side of the debate around education reform and

109. In 2013, New York Appleseed estimated that “half of all school districts already
have or are on their way to having sufficient numbers of middle-class or white students
to pursue traditional racial and economic diversity strategies.” WITHIN OUR REACH:
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 2013, supra note 94, at 18.
110. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (highlighting increases in the
percentage of Black and Latino students attending majority-minority and
hyper-segregated schools).
111. In New York City public school, 72.8% of students are classified as
“economically disadvantaged” as of the date of this writing. See DOE Data at a
Glance,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/reports/doe-data-at-a-glance
[https://perma.cc/59JM-CSFW] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
112. See generally MICHAEL HOLZMAN, SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., A
ROTTING APPLE: EDUCATION REDLINING IN NEW YORK CITY (2012),
http://schottfoundation.org/resources/education-redlining-new-york-city
[https://perma.cc/B5UX-FTYE].
113. See WITHIN OUR REACH: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 2020, supra note 104, at 18.
114. The population of New York City in 2011 was estimated to be 8,244,910. See
Sam Roberts, Population Growth in New York City Is Outpacing 2010 Census, 2011
Estimates
Show,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
5,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/nyregion/census-estimates-for-2011-show-popul
ation-growth-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/S72Y-8KUK]. The population of
Buffalo, New York, is 255,244. Buffalo, WORLD POPULATION REV.,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/buffalo-ny-population
[https://perma.cc/B96H-4FDV].
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the role of charter schools in the City might agree to reasonable
initiatives to reduce segregation.
Perhaps most importantly, Appleseed’s review of demographic
trends and recent literature on school integration threw into relief the
fact that New York City — like many cities in the United States — was
in the throes of ongoing demographic change of cataclysmic and
historic proportions. 115 Its population was increasing, and growing
numbers of more affluent people were choosing to live in New York
City.116 The traditional metropolitan configuration of the last 40 years
that allowed the Milliken decisions to act as a block was breaking down
in the City, and, however much neighborhood patterns drove school
segregation within the City, those patterns were altering rapidly.
Orrick’s legal analysis had also determined that the PICS decision
did not in fact prevent school districts from promoting racially diverse
schools and preventing racial isolation, and that the Bush
Administration guidance for school districts was misleading. 117 In
short, we believed there was a compelling argument that legal
advocacy, done right, could transform the public school discussion in
New York City.
In the twentieth century, the most prominent role of legal advocacy
in pursuing school integration had been, of course, to coordinate and
bring litigation. In 2011, however, Appleseed and Orrick set upon a
different path. We knew that, even if a legal theory could be
developed, litigation would be uncertain in its impact, prohibitively
costly, and likely to take decades before improving conditions for
students. 118 Moreover, the network of Appleseed centers had been
founded by attorneys drawing on their experiences that administrative
agencies (the executive branch of government) represented a fruitful
and too-often overlooked target for legal advocacy. Knowing that
clients seeking assistance from law firms with problems with
government agencies typically seek to avoid costly processes of

115. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO
SCHOOLS AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 15–
16 (2011).
116. See Sam Roberts, Census Estimates Show Another Increase in New York
City’s Non-Hispanic White Population, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/nyregion/census-estimates-show-another-increas
e-in-new-york-citys-non-hispanic-white-population.html
[https://perma.cc/6PWL-C2WK].
117. See Dear Colleague letter, supra note 49.
118. For example, see Susan Eaton’s account of the heartbreakingly long process of
the Sheff case. See SUSAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN
EDUCATION ON TRIAL (2009).
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litigation or lobbying for new legislation, Appleseed’s founders
believed that pro bono attorneys could productively appeal to the
discretion that administrative officials enjoy under existing law.119
Our understanding of the history of school integration also gave rise
to concerns about the way in which attorneys — often beneficiaries of
privilege and rarely trained in matters of education and pedagogy —
took center stage in the twentieth century, crowding out the voices of
those most directly affected by school segregation (low-income
students and parents of color) and those most expert in matters of
educating children (educators and school leaders). Moreover, as
scholar Vanessa Siddle-Walker has uncovered, the popular historical
narrative about the role of lawyers is incomplete — the success of these
attorneys was supported at every step by a network of Black
educators.120 Our organizations were convinced that attorneys should
no longer lead movements for school integration.
Yet we were equally skeptical of the idea that legal organizations
should go to the other extreme and play a passive role in identifying
social problems and possible solutions. Placing too much burden on
affected communities to solve complex problems and racist structures
not of their own making seemed all too convenient to the status quo.
How, for instance, were stakeholders to know that integration was
even a possible goal so long as NYCDOE’s attorneys maintained a
bovine insistence that it was constitutionally prohibited?
Appleseed and Orrick started with the premise that legal advocates
might play an important role in providing reliable and independent
analysis of the policies and other governmental decisions underpinning
and exacerbating school segregation, and, in the process, expand the
range of policy solutions for stakeholders to consider.
Our
organizations believed that if people knew more about the realities and
the possibilities, we could engender a public discussion of school
integration and support stakeholders — those living in the affected
communities and facing the impacts of the racist policies directly —
who would be interested in proposing solutions to NYCDOE.

119. See
Our
History,
APPLESEED,
https://www.appleseednetwork.org/our-history.html [https://perma.cc/RSW4-MXEF]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
120. See VANESSA SIDDLE-WALKER, THE LOST EDUCATION OF HORACE TATE:
UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN HEROES WHO FOUGHT FOR JUSTICE IN SCHOOLS 10 (2018)
(“[T]he country has been almost unilaterally steeped in a story repeatedly told and
almost universally accepted: the NAACP protested injustice and crafted the successful
Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case that was supposed to deliver black
children from poor schools to new opportunities.”).
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At its core, “theory of change” methodology calls on organizations
to engage in an iterative process focused on articulating the long-term
issue they are trying to address,121 and from there explicitly identifying
(1) the organization’s core competencies, 122 (2) the appropriate
stakeholders needed to design and make these changes,123 (3) concrete
steps that the organization can take to improve these issues in both the
near and long-term, 124 and (4) benchmarks by which to judge
success.125 The organization should then revisit its theory of change
periodically to refine its inputs and target outputs as the movement
evolves.126
While “working backwards” may sound like common-sense
planning, it is a particularly important exercise for legal organizations
advocating for change in non-litigation contexts. Litigation, once
undertaken, has a clear aim (albeit divergent paths to get there):
achieve a positive outcome for the client at hand.127 A broad policy

121. See, e.g., Jean Ellis, Diana Parkinson & Avan Wadia, Making Connections:
Using a Theory of Change to Develop Planning and Evaluation, CHARITIES

EVALUATION
SERVS.
11–13
(Feb.
2011),
https://www.salfordsocialvalue.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/makingconnection
susingatheoryofchangetodevelopplan-800-808.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN2L-QPU2].
122. See, e.g., ORGANIZATIONAL RSCH. SERVS., THEORY OF CHANGE: A PRACTICAL
TOOL
FOR
ACTION,
RESULTS
AND
LEARNING
10–11
(2004),
https://www.aecf.org/resources/theory-of-change/
[https://perma.cc/478T-E62E]
(describing core competencies as “the building blocks that enable powerful strategies
to become actualized” including “people, processes, supports, models, techniques,
structures, plans, frameworks and other inputs needed to enact, bring to scale and
sustain powerful change”).
123. See, e.g., Ellis et al., supra note 121, at 3.
124. See, e.g., id. at 2–4.
125. See, e.g., Chris L.S. Coryn et al., A Systematic Review of Theory-Driven
Evaluation Practice from 1990 to 2009, 32 AM. J. EVALUATION 199 (2014) (reviewing
systems of theory-driven evaluation); PK Thornton et al., Responding to Global

Change: A Theory of Change Approach to Making Agricultural Research for
Development Outcome-Based, 152 AGRIC. SYS. 145, 151 (2017) (describing the
application of theory of change to measurement); Ellis et al., supra note 121, at 19.
126. See ANDREA A. ANDERSON, ASPEN INST., THE COMMUNITY BUILDER’S

APPROACH TO THEORY OF CHANGE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THEORY DEVELOPMENT
27
(2006),
http://www.theoryofchange.org/pdf/TOC_fac_guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XW2H-N48Z] (“The best way to use a theory [of change] is to
periodically update it by convening a group to review the pathway of change and
assumptions in the theory and compare it to the real-world initiative they have
implemented.”).
127. Of course, litigation can also be (and has been) part of a larger strategy to create
social change. In impact litigation, in particular, attorneys seek to select cases that will
help them move case law in a positive direction. See Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for
Social Change: What’s a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201, 220–21 (1999).
Nonetheless, because lawyers have a duty to zealously pursue the interests of their
client throughout litigation, a lawyer’s ability to advocate for broad social change and
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goal (without identifying specific steps) could, in contrast, encompass
many divergent aims that leave an organization spread too thin to
make contributions where its core competencies could have the
greatest impact. The iterative process of theory of change is also useful
for long-term movements, including reducing school segregation.
Appleseed and Orrick already had a long-term mission in mind: to
increase racial and socioeconomic integration in New York City
schools to the benefit of all students. Part of this process necessarily
involved lifting artificially placed barriers to advocacy from affected
communities. This view of lawyers as vital co-participants and
supporters in social justice movements, rather than leaders, relates to
ideas of “community lawyering.”
Charles Elsesser describes
community lawyering as “a wide range of community-building and
advocacy-related activities through which advocates contribute their
legal knowledge and skills to support community identified initiatives
that return power to the community.” 128 Rather than seek to drive
change through litigation or by pulling community organizations in one
direction, community lawyers seek to leverage their experiences in
meeting with policymakers, drafting proposals and policies, and
advocating positions both publicly and privately, to support
communities in achieving the policy solutions they desire. 129
Implicit in Appleseed and Orrick’s approach, however, was the
limitation that legal advocates would provide such support only to
those organizations and community members who shared their goal of
increased school integration. While it could be argued that all
community lawyers bring their own biases and priorities into the
decisions about which community organizations to support, the point
has special salience in light of the fact that the landscape of advocacy
for education justice was highly contested and that most community
organizations focused on educational justice did not prioritize school
integration as a solution in 2011. For better or for worse, our advocacy
proceeded from our own conclusions about the importance of school

to resolve conflicts within a movement will be constrained to the extent their client’s
interests and desires differ from the movement’s broader goals. See, e.g., id. at 217–20
(describing how a traditional, client-centered view of professional responsibility can
constrain an attorney’s ability to mediate conflicting demands of class members in class
action cases).
128. Charles Elsesser, Community Lawyering — The Role of Lawyers in the Social
Justice Movement, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 375, 376 (2013) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Ellen Hemley, Supporting Local Communities Through Community
Lawyering, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 500, 505–06 (2012)).
129. See id. at 384–85. See generally Johnson, supra note 127.
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integration rather than as a response to priorities expressed by
communities.130
Accordingly, Appleseed and Orrick determined early on that (1) we
needed to remove any legal or regulatory structures preventing
NYCDOE action, (2) we needed to create a precedent for a
student-assignment plan that would promote diversity, and (3)
NYCDOE would need to offer some leadership — not to displace the
role of affected communities, but to enable it. These initiatives would
build on Appleseed and Orrick’s core competencies. As legal
organizations, we recognized that we could use our institutional
knowledge and legal analysis to advocate within the administrative
state. We also recognized the limitations of lawyers as movement
leaders 131 and prioritized input and agreement from community
stakeholders to ensure that a proposed plan opened the door for a
solution that community members actually desired. More importantly,
we adopted a mission and framework that became a pivotal building
block in catalyzing and sustaining effective policy change.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Challenging Legal and Regulatory Structures Inhibiting
NYCDOE Action

Beginning in the spring of 2011, Appleseed and a team of 15 Orrick
attorneys and staff began interviewing a wide range of experts,
scholars, and community members and reviewing documents on issues
pertaining to school segregation and the possibilities of school
integration in New York City. Whenever possible, we conducted these
interviews in person in or near the offices or homes of the individuals
involved. Over the course of a year, Orrick attorneys used the
information from these interviews to develop a comprehensive
memorandum analyzing the legal and administrative structure of
NYCDOE. The memorandum outlined the scope of and limitations
on NYCDOE’s administrative and regulatory powers within state law
to show the extent to which NYCDOE could promote integration
within the existing framework.
Orrick’s legal analysis concluded that there were few legal
constraints on NYCDOE’s ability to act unilaterally to integrate its
schools under the PICS framework. Some important exceptions

130. See discussion of the research underlying the benefits of school integration

supra notes 54–62.
131. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text.
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applied, however — most importantly, (1) the power granted by state
law to parent boards established in each community school district
called Community Education Councils (CECs) to veto the
modification of attendance-zone lines for elementary and middle
schools,132 (2) the power of the Mayor to replace the Chancellor of
Schools at any time,133 (3) state law conferring significant autonomy on
charter schools within the City,134 and (4) state law governing the City’s
famous “specialized” high schools and effectively preventing
NYCDOE from interfering with admissions standards at the four most
prestigious of these schools. 135 Our research also revealed that,
contrary to popular understanding, there was evidence of some recent
initiatives that could plausibly be understood as having integration
goals — most notably a modest student-assignment plan in Community
School District 1 in Manhattan. Every one of these initiatives,
however, had been eliminated or severely cut back under the
Bloomberg Administration.136
This analysis lent support to our working premise that legal
advocacy would need to take place in coordination with stakeholders
at the community school district level — to secure the buy-in of CECs
and, when the time came, that of the Mayor and Chancellor of Schools.

132. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney 2019). According to the law, CECs
were given the responsibility to review the districts’ educational programs and assess
their effects on student achievement, submit an annual evaluation of the
superintendent, and provide input to the Chancellor and City Board on matters of
concern. See id.
133. See id. § 2590-h.
134. See id. §§ 2850–57.
135. See id. § 2590-h(1)(b). The sheer symbolic impact of these schools meant that
whatever embryonic debate about segregation and exclusion was occurring in 2011
focused on these four schools.
136. NYCDOE terminated Community School District 1’s modest
student-assignment plan around 2006. See WITHIN OUR REACH: ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS 2020, supra note 104, at 6, 10. Around the same time, the Brooklyn New
School was told to stop giving extra weight to students from low-income families. See
Interview by Ctr. for Pub. Rsch. & Leadership with Anna Allanbrook, Principal of
Brooklyn New Sch. (Feb. 17, 2012). During Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure, the number of
“educational option” high schools declined significantly. See N.Y. APPLESEED, WITHIN
OUR REACH: SEGREGATION IN NEW YORK CITY HIGH SCHOOLS AND WHAT WE CAN
DO ABOUT IT: HIGH SCHOOL CHOICE (2014) [hereinafter WITHIN OUR REACH: HIGH
SCHOOLS
2014],
https://nyappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/Within-Our-Reach-3rd-Brief-April-2014FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXD6-7KWK]. Also, under Bloomberg’s watch, two of
the City’s top specialized high schools, Stuyvesant and Bronx Science, both terminated
their participation in the Discovery Program. See Megan Finnegan & Stephon
Johnson, Benign Neglect? Who Killed the Discovery Program?, OUR TOWN (May 12,
2011), https://issuu.com/ourtown/docs/051111/8.
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It also suggested a strategy to avoid thorny issues pertaining to charter
schools (even though there was considerable commentary at that time
suggesting that charter schools might be a good place to experiment
with integration),137 because of the difficulty of scaling up successful
models within NYCDOE and because of the intense polarization
around the issue. We also decided not to focus on the specialized high
schools given the longtime failure of advocates to effect change in
admissions to these schools, the necessity of dedicating large amounts
of resources to legislative lobbying at the state level, and the relatively
small number of students affected as a percentage of the total high
school population in New York City.138

137. James Ryan opined that most school districts would want to avoid district-wide
programs like the controlled choice plans in Wake County, North Carolina, and
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in favor of “less coercive methods.” He specifically
recommended combining neighborhood school options with choice elements —
particularly magnet and charter schools. See RYAN, supra note 115, at 296–97. Richard
Kahlenberg and Halley Potter wrote in a 2012 report that, “[t]he charter school
movement is uniquely positioned to lead innovation in this area and demonstrate both
the feasibility and benefit of an integrated learning model.” RICHARD KAHLENBERG
& HALEY POTTER, POV. & RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL & CENTURY FOUND.,
DIVERSE CHARTER SCHOOLS: CAN RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION
PROMOTE
BETTER
OUTCOMES
FOR
STUDENTS?
4
(2012),
https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2012/05/24013615/Diverse_Charter_Scho
ols-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ89-ZBE9]; see also Sarah Carr, The Integrationists,
NEXT CITY (Aug. 20, 2012), https://nextcity.org/features/view/the-integrationists
[https://perma.cc/SHG3-97BX]. Jennifer Stillman concluded, “[w]hat charter schools
have as a policy tool is the ability to start as new schools, which are much easier to craft
into diverse schools with the right outreach efforts. Changing existing schools, though
possible, is very challenging.” Jennifer Stillman, Charter Schools No Silver Bullet for
Integration, But a Start, CHALKBEAT (July 5, 2012, 12:00 PM),
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2012/7/5/21096675/charter-schools-no-silver-bullet-for-integr
ation-but-a-start [https://perma.cc/P83Y-JNWA]. Stillman published a book based on
her research. See JENNIFER BURNS STILLMAN, GENTRIFICATION AND SCHOOLS: THE
PROCESS OF INTEGRATION WHEN WHITES REVERSE FLIGHT (2012). Scholar Priscilla
Wohlstetter emphasized the promise of diverse charter schools and echoed the
sentiments of many experts in writing that, given current realities, “the likelihood of
achieving socioeconomic integration throughout all urban schools seems very dim,
indeed.” Priscilla Wohlstetter, A New Solution to an Old Problem: School Integration,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
23,
2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/priscilla-wohlstetter/a-new-solution-to-an-old_b_8630
760.html [https://perma.cc/G2KF-UEC3]. For a contemporary response to these
arguments, see David Tipson & Khin Mai Aung, Op-Ed: Aim for Diverse Schools, But
Don’t Leave It Up to Charters, NEXT CITY (Feb. 28, 2013),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/op-ed-aim-for-diverse-schools-but-dont-leave-it-up-tocharters [https://perma.cc/VD6F-2YRA].
138. For the 2019–2020 school year, there were a total of 325,842 high school
students, and 15,869 went to specialized high schools (4.9%). Information and Data
Overview,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
EDUC.:
INFOHUB,
https://infohub.nyced.org/reports/school-quality/information-and-data-overview
[https://perma.cc/U3CC-VPS6] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (click “Demographic
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B. Creating a Precedential Student-Assignment Plan

As Appleseed and Orrick were reaching these conclusions, one of
the experts we interviewed, a former NYCDOE official, shared that
some within the agency’s leadership ranks — now under a new
Chancellor of Schools, Dennis Walcott — were concerned about the
increased levels of segregation attained under former Chancellor Joel
Klein’s tenure and might be open to collaboration on the issue. 139
After some initial conversations, NYCDOE officials told us about a
school building under construction near the border between
Community School Districts 13 and 15. The new building would house
elementary schools for both districts — an unusual situation.
Community members had already begun to note the very different
demographics of the two districts: District 13 had a relatively large
Black and Hispanic population and small white population;140 District
15, by contrast, had a relatively small Black population and a relatively
large white and affluent population. 141 The prospect of two
separate-but-equal schools co-located under the same roof alarmed
We recognized an
community members and NYCDOE. 142
opportunity to realize one of our goals: creating a precedent for a
student-assignment plan that would promote diversity.

Snapshot” hyperlink); see also Specialized High Schools, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/enrollment/enroll-grade-by-grade/specialized-high-schoo
ls [https://perma.cc/AZ8V-2W9X] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) (click “What Are the
Specialized High Schools?” drop down box).
139. Based on Authors’ oral communication.
140. See HOLZMAN, supra note 112, at 75.
141. See id. at 83.
142. Co-location of schools within a single building is common in New York City.
See Suzanne Wulach & James Kemple, Trends in School Co-Locations in NYC, RSCH.
ALL.
FOR
N.Y.C.
SCHS.,
https://research.steinhardt.nyu.edu/site/research_alliance/2016/09/12/trends-in-schoolco-locations-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/2VMG-E8BM] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
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Location of New School Site Near the Border of
Districts 13 and 15 in Brooklyn.143

We note at this juncture that some of the advocates we had met in
our outreach expressed grave concerns about collaborating with both
the individual who introduced us to NYCDOE officials and with
NYCDOE officials themselves due to the polarized debates about the
Bloomberg education policies. These advocates advised that true
collaboration with government actors was impossible because power
dynamics would render such arrangements illusory and unacceptable
compromise and cooption were the inevitable results of any attempt.
Best, according to this frame of mind, to work separately to allow
movements to express their ideologies not only in their goals, but also
in every aspect of their practices and to generate demands untainted
by the agendas and values of oppressive government regimes. Perhaps
underlying these views was the idea that actors in a movement need at
all times to embody and model the moral principles motivating their
advocacy; working with the wrong person or with institutions
represented a compromise of essential values.

143. Map created by Appleseed.
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Appleseed and Orrick, however, were not part of a movement but
were seeking to lay the foundation for one. When Appleseed wavered
in response to these critiques, attorneys at Orrick invoked principles of
legal advocacy: the importance of results over idealistic
pronouncement, the discipline of strategy, and the self-effacing, often
dispassionate role of the attorney in advancing the client’s interest —
a role in which the lawyer’s individual ideology and need for validation
must be set aside. Appleseed and Orrick decided to move forward with
the project. Direct engagement with government officials became a
hallmark of our advocacy over the years that followed (not
untempered by instances of harsh criticism).
The school building at issue was strategically important not only
because of its unfortunate potential for a stark showcasing of racial and
economic segregation, but also because it provided an opportunity to
work within the apparent safe harbor of Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in PICS: the building’s site on the border of two community
school districts offered the chance to employ “strategic site selection of
new schools.” 144 These new schools would by necessity require
re-drawing of attendance zones and therefore offered the chance to do
so “with general recognition of the demographics of
neighborhoods.”145 Depending on how these lines were drawn, there
might also be opportunities for “recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion.”146
In the spring of 2012, Orrick provided Appleseed with financial
support to retain the services of the Center for Public Research and
Leadership at Columbia Law School (CPRL). Orrick attorneys
worked with CPRL to conduct extensive research and interviews in the
course of which we learned, among other things, that there was
substantially more flexibility in the way NYCDOE managed student
assignment for elementary schools than we had previously understood.
Through the efforts of CPRL’s director, we persuaded NYCDOE to
use a single school for students of both districts — the same school
whose original building had previously occupied the construction site
— P.S. 133.
By the late summer, the community task force convened by
Councilmember Stephen Levin to address the gamut of issues arising
from the building’s ongoing construction had turned to issues of

144. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 852
(2007).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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student assignment for the school. The task force included principals
and assistant principals from P.S. 133 and several nearby schools,
parents serving the school originally on the construction site,
community-education council members from both school districts,
parents at P.S. 133, and representatives from the teachers’ union.
Appleseed unapologetically pursued its own agenda of establishing a
model for student assignment for integration on this task force. Using
the findings from legal and other research compiled by Orrick and
CPRL, Appleseed challenged NYCDOE’s insistence that student
assignment by traditional attendance zone or by choice (open to all
students but limited by lottery) were the only two options on the table.
Task force members showed an interest in learning more from
Appleseed and Orrick about other ways of admitting students to the
school.
Once the task force had decided upon a goal of an intentionally
diverse school, Appleseed and Orrick shifted to something more like a
community-lawyering role, providing research memoranda to the task
force with a menu of student-assignment options available under the
PICS decision. Task force members, drawing on their expertise and
experience, gravitated towards an option using enrollment targets
established by New York State law to require charter schools to serve
English language learners and students eligible for the free and
reduced-price lunch program at rates “comparable to the enrollment
figures” for those categories of students across the relevant community
school district. 147 The task force members wisely chose this approach
as a political strategy with a charter-school-friendly administration —
a key consideration that Appleseed and Orrick may not have
anticipated on our own.
NYCDOE representatives on the task force initially reported that
setting enrollment targets for students in this way was prohibited under
PICS. Appleseed and Orrick were able to assist the task force in
rebutting this argument, and with help from the press and new federal
guidance from the Obama Administration, NYCDOE’s arguments
were defeated.148 Even though the objections lacked merit, we viewed
147. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2852(9-a)(b)(i) (McKinney 2015).
148. See Alan Neuhauser, School Officials, DOE Embroiled in Affirmative Action
Fight
at
P.S.
133,
DNAINFO
(Oct.
15,
2012,
11:21
AM),
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20121015/sunset-park/school-officials-doe-embroi
led-affirmative-action-fight-over-ps-133 [https://perma.cc/EE3Q-E78K]; see also

Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial
Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, U.S. DEP’T EDUCATION (Nov. 2011),

https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html
[https://perma.cc/UR3J-LGMN]. On July 3, 2018, the Trump Administration removed
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this advocacy as part of our work to eliminate legal and regulatory
structures preventing NYCDOE action. Having conceded the point,
NYCDOE studied the mechanisms by which some charter schools had
modified their admissions lottery to meet the enrollment targets and
proposed the same for P.S. 133. With this action, NYCDOE
established a precedent of prioritizing students for admission by rough
indicators of socioeconomic status. Chancellor Walcott announced
that P.S. 133 could be a model for traditional public schools across the
City.149
But schools had already taken note of this development before the
Chancellor’s announcement. Almost immediately after the official
adoption of the P.S. 133 plan by the two local school districts in early
2013, other schools began seeking their own versions of the plan.
Appleseed provided guidance to several of these school communities
on legal and practical elements involved in the plans and helped them
advocate for permission to prioritize students — again by providing
information and advice rather than attempting to dictate how each
school should proceed.
The appointment of Carmen Fariña as Chancellor of Schools by
newly elected Mayor Bill de Blasio in January of 2014, however,
represented an unexpected setback. The spring of 2014 found
advocates seemingly right back to where they started, with NYCDOE
attorneys once again questioning the legality of the P.S. 133 plan and
of prioritizing students by socioeconomic indicators in general. Once
again, it appeared that specious legal objections served to mask
antipathy to integration. The constant presence of Orrick attorneys in
meetings and written communications on the state of the law
represented a bulwark against these arguments, but by the fall of 2014,
NYCDOE had failed to budge.

its support for this guidance and re-posted the Bush-Administration guidance. The
2011 guidance is still available online. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
RESCINDED: GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY
AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PW9S-94T8].
149. See Anika Anand, P.S. 133’s Innovative Admissions Model Aims for More
Diversity,
CHALKBEAT
(Aug.
29,
2013,
5:01
PM),
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2013/8/29/21091165/p-s-133-s-innovative-admissions-model-ai
ms-for-more-diversity [https://perma.cc/P22Q-MTZ4].
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C. Coordination with the State Education Department
and NYCDOE

New York State Commissioner of Education John King, Jr.
provided an opportunity to break through the logjam. In the summer
of 2014, King had tapped Appleseed and Orrick to help develop a
statewide grant program. The UCLA Center for Civil Rights had
released a damning report earlier that year with quantitative
information showing that New York State schools were more
segregated than those of any other state in the nation. 150
Commissioner King, who harbored a longtime interest in integration,
seized the moment to take action. As with the former NYCDOE
official, King was viewed by many progressive education advocates as
too closely associated with education-reform ideologies to work with.
In addition to providing legal research by Orrick attorneys on the
possibilities of using federal school-improvement grants to advance
integration, Appleseed and Orrick advised on the structure of the grant
program ultimately called the Socioeconomic Integration Pilot
Program (SIPP)151 and crafted a draft Request for Proposals for the
New York State Education Department (NYSED). In the process,
Appleseed and Orrick ensured that the new program would require
school districts to use “a choice-based admissions policy that [would]
promote socioeconomic diversity in the school’s entry grade through
consideration of at-risk factors for each applicant,” effectively
requiring recipients to do the very thing that NYCDOE was claiming
to be constitutionally prohibited. 152 In 2015, NYCDOE applied for
eight grants under SIPP and never again challenged the legality of the
P.S. 133 plan.
During this period, Appleseed and Orrick also moved forward on
our goal to push NYCDOE to take a leadership role on school
integration. Our 2013 and 2014 policy briefings based on Orrick’s
research identified the lack of a clear policy statement from NYCDOE
on the benefits and importance of school diversity as contributing to
confusion and diffidence among NYCDOE employees — particularly

150. See KUCSERA & ORFIELD, supra note 63, at iv.
151. See Press Release, New York State Educ. Dep’t, NYS Schools to Receive
Grants
to
Promote
Socioeconomic
Integration
(Dec.
30,
2014),
http://www.nysed.gov/news/2015/nys-schools-receive-grants-promote-socioeconomic-i
ntegration [https://perma.cc/W499-5M3M].
152. 2015–18 Title I School Improvement Section 1003(a): Socioeconomic
Integration
Pilot
Program,
N.Y.
ST.
EDUC.
DEP’T
4
(2014),
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/funding/2015-18-title-1-ses-integration-grant/ses-integratio
n-grant.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB6A-52TH].
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school principals uncertain about the extent to which they were
permitted to plan for or even speak about integration.153
In the fall of 2014, City Council Member Brad Lander tapped
Appleseed, Orrick, and consulting firm Metis Associates to help
develop reporting requirements for a bill to be introduced in the City
Council. A hearing on the bill was held in December 2014 where
Appleseed’s Executive Director testified on the need for clear
direction from NYCDOE; 154 a new student-organizing initiative
IntegrateNYC 155 also testified as to student experiences with
segregated schools.156 In 2015, the City Council passed the law along
with a resolution calling on NYCDOE to adopt the kind of policy
statement we were seeking in support of school diversity. 157 After
requiring some changes to the bill, Mayor de Blasio used a public
ceremony to sign the School Diversity Accountability Act into law.158
Even a state grant program and the new attention to school
integration from the City Council, however, did not seem to be enough
to push NYCDOE to action on the schools waiting for diversity
admission plans. The final push came from a flurry of news reporting
in the fall of 2015. High-profile public processes to re-draw attendance
zone boundaries for two elementary schools — one on the Upper West
Side 159 and the other in Brooklyn 160 — could not have been better

153. See WITHIN OUR REACH: ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 2013, supra note 94, at 8. For
other briefings, see WITHIN OUR REACH: HIGH SCHOOLS 2014, supra note 136; N.Y.
APPLESEED, WITHIN OUR REACH: SEGREGATION IN NYC DISTRICT ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: ADDRESSING INTERNAL SEGREGATION
AND
HARNESSING THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY (2014),
https://nyappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/Within-Our-Reach-2nd-Brief-February-2
014-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9KM-32TR].
154. See Testimony of David F. Tipson, Director of New York Appleseed: New
York City Council — Committee on Education, N.Y. APPLESEED (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://nyappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/NYA-TESTIMONY-FOR-CITY-COU
NCIL-12-11-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK6G-7F44].
155. At the time, IntegrateNYC was known as IntegrateNYC4Me.
156. For video and other materials relating to the December 11, 2014, hearing, see
December 11, 2014 Committee on Education, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=360348&GUID=9D434FA2-8
295-4560-B7FA-3AB11C69BDE7&Options=info|&Search=
[https://perma.cc/VCZ8-K8N3].
157. See N.Y.C. Council Resolution No. 453 (2015).
158. See N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 59 (2015).
159. See Kate Taylor, Education Dept. Drops Proposal to Rezone Upper West Side
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
18,
2015),
Schools,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/nyregion/eucation-department-drops-proposal-t
o-rezone-upper-west-side-manhattan-schools.html [https://perma.cc/L65U-DVUN].
160. See Kate Taylor, Race and Class Collide in a Plan for Two Brooklyn Schools,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
22,
2015),
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timed to undermine the longtime canard that school segregation was
exclusively a product of neighborhood segregation. Painfully clear in
both rezonings was the fact that simple adjustment of lines could lead
to dramatic levels of integration; as with P.S. 133, schools in New York
City could see more integration simply by changing the way that they
admitted nearby students. These were hardly the first rezonings from
which these conclusions could be drawn; the difference in 2015 was that
the prior three years of advocacy had framed key questions squarely
and challenged knee-jerk responses.161
Soon, however, reporters extended their investigative efforts far
beyond these immediate issues. Over a period of about a year,
reporters like Patrick Wall from Chalkbeat and Amy Zimmer from
DNAInfo.com thoroughly probed the issue of school segregation in
New York. Wall wrote hard-hitting pieces on NYCDOE’s failure to
approve diversity admissions plans for elementary schools that had
requested them.162 Perhaps most famously, Zimmer caught Chancellor
Fariña stating publicly that “pen-pal” relationships between students
at segregated schools might be a solution.163 Reporters, in our view,
were drawn to the issue’s novelty, its clear nexus to some of the most
famous events of the American civil rights movement, and its endless
complexity. We note, however, that much of the intense interest in
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/nyregion/race-and-class-collide-in-a-plan-for-tw
o-brooklyn-schools.html [https://perma.cc/6KYC-W689].
161. Daniel Hunter, citing Bill Moyer, writes that two otherwise similar bellwether
events separated by time can generate very different public responses if, in the
intervening years, movements emerge to “seed local groups, . . . hone responses [to
opposition,] and develop alternative policy platforms.” Daniel Hunter, Don’t Believe
the Lie That Voting Is All You Can Do, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/opinion/voting-2020-election-blm-movement.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/MU4X-GGNT]. They do this by “amplify[ing] complex questions
that otherwise get simplified to sound bites.” Id.
162. See Patrick Wall, Fariña Says City Is Still Reviewing Schools’ Diversity Plans,
with Quick Changes Unlikely, CHALKBEAT (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:13 PM),
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2015/9/8/21092358/farina-says-city-is-still-reviewing-schools-d
iversity-plans-with-quick-changes-unlikely [https://perma.cc/GDN2-STHN]; Patrick
Wall, Nearly a Year After NYC Principals Float Diversity Plans, City Has Yet to Sign
CHALKBEAT
(Sept.
1,
2015,
6:15
PM),
Off,
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2015/9/1/21092367/nearly-a-year-after-nyc-principals-float-di
versity-plans-city-has-yet-to-sign-off [https://perma.cc/58X9-HXD7].
163. See Amy Zimmer & Noah Hurowitz, Schools Boss Touts Pen Pal System as
Substitute for Racial Integration, DNAINFO (Oct. 29, 2015, 11:59 AM),
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20151029/upper-west-side/schools-boss-touts-penpal-system-as-substitute-for-racial-integration/ [https://perma.cc/M58P-25BW]; see
also Amy Zimmer & Nicholas Rizzi, Racial Segregation in City Schools Is Just
‘Reality,’ De Blasio Says, DNAINFO (Oct. 29, 2015, 6:16 PM),
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20151029/park-slope/racial-segregation-city-schoo
ls-is-just-reality-de-blasio-says/ [https://perma.cc/C4DD-ZJTL].
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reporting on segregation in 2015 stemmed from the interests of often
formally educated and white journalists. What was unclear at the time
was if this sudden interest included a readership that reflected other
demographics outside of their own — particularly the perspectives and
concerns of voices of color on this topic — a pattern many marginalized
communities know too well.
Appleseed and Orrick remained ready resources for reporters
during this period and managed in many cases to influence the way in
which they framed their articles. In November 2015, just weeks after
the “pen-pal” statement appeared in the press, NYCDOE announced
that seven elementary schools would be permitted to use diversity
admissions plans based on the P.S. 133 model under a new admissions
pilot.164 The precedent established by P.S. 133 had extended to more
schools and would become the essential building block that NYCDOE
would use in nearly all future integration initiatives. As of 2020, 136
school programs across New York City were using set-aside admissions
plans to promote diversity.
D. Building on Progress

The announcement of the new pilot represented a victory for all
three of our initial goals: creating a precedent, eliminating legal and
regulatory barriers, and pushing NYCDOE to lead on the issue of
school integration. It also represented the moment at which
communities directly affected by the problem of segregation — in this
case, the parents and educators at the seven schools, not Appleseed
and Orrick — largely began to lead a broad-based movement for
integrated schools. At Appleseed and Orrick, we knew that we had
likely accomplished most of what legal advocates could and should
accomplish in the absence of such a movement.
Throughout 2015, IntegrateNYC started to transform meetings of
advocates by centering the experiences and research of students.
These students’ careful research and passionate advocacy undoubtedly
contributed to NYCDOE’s decision to move forward with the pilot.
Appleseed partnered with this exciting new initiative and began to plan
for a shift in its strategy. While still advocating for NYCDOE to adopt
a formal policy statement (this did not happen until 2017), by the end
of 2015, we viewed our initial goals as having been mostly achieved and

164. See Amy Zimmer, 7 Elementary Schools Will Try to Boost Student Diversity
Pilot
Program,
DNAINFO
(Nov.
22,
2015,
9:48
PM),
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20151120/fort-greene/7-brooklyn-manhattan-scho
ols-win-fight-for-diversity-based-admissions/ [https://perma.cc/M757-H899].
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began to shift more into a supporting role for a nascent movement led
by affected communities. Appleseed began a search to hire a new
employee to direct its school-integration work — a new leader who
would draw not on legal training but on a wholly different set of skills
to work with the students of IntegrateNYC and other communities to
build a movement.
Starting in the fall of 2016, Appleseed’s new School-Diversity
Project Director worked closely with the students of IntegrateNYC
and with other allies to support the development of a new citywide
coalition of advocates. Appleseed supported the student leaders in the
development of a new Real Integration framework for defining and
evaluating integration efforts derived from the Green factors 165 that
eventually became the lens used by NYCDOE itself. 166 The “5 R’s” of
the Real Integration framework defines integration as a holistic
solution to dismantling school segregation beyond merely moving
students from one school to another by (1) achieving Racial, ethnic,
and economic diversity in composition, (2) appointing leadership
Representative of this diversity, (3) facilitating Relationships across
people of different backgrounds, (4) practicing Restorative justice, and
(5) sharing equitable access to Resources and opportunities.167 As a
result of this framework, Appleseed was able to move away from the
limitations of the term “desegregation” and toward more innovative
strategies.168 This Real Integration framework became the basis for a
new stage in the development of Appleseed’s theory of change — one
that distinguished the limitations on legal advocacy in desegregation
efforts from expanded opportunities for legal advocacy in supporting
Real Integration.
To center the needs of community members and influence the
necessary stakeholders for policy solutions, Appleseed had to expand
past traditional core competencies of legal organizations. The Real
165. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
166. See
Real
Integration,
INTEGRATENYC,
https://www.integratenyc.org/realintegration [https://perma.cc/9MUJ-PTCL] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2021).
167. See id.
168. Some define “desegregation” as the act of “dismantling the beliefs, policies, and
practices that physically separate students into racially and economically isolated
schools, tracks, classes, and/or programs, that invariably results in inequitable access
to programs, resources and opportunities.” N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCH. DIVERSITY
ADVISORY GRP., MAKING THE GRADE: THE PATH TO REAL INTEGRATION AND
EQUITY
FOR
NYC
PUBLIC
SCHOOL
STUDENTS
108
(2019),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/1c478c_4de7a85cae884c53a8d48750e0858172.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8EBZ-SX6R]. The term “desegregation” has often been
misunderstood as interchangeable with the term “integration.” See id. at 23.
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Integration framework allowed Appleseed to do this by creating space
for advocacy unconfined by strictly legal strategies focused only on
desegregation. 169 If Appleseed had defined success against school
segregation narrowly as desegregation, the role of lawyers in
integration initiatives for the twenty-first century would have become
unnecessarily costly and artificially constrained.
This new framework fostered new pathways and conversations
regarding what the role of a lawyer outside litigation could be. Legal
advocates could now identify obstacles and propose new language to
allow innovation for integrative policies and practices. Defining the 5
R’s of Real Integration created a guide not only for Appleseed and
partnering lawyers but also for other stakeholders that had previously
faltered in envisioning integration as an essential piece to achieving
Appleseed formally incorporated the
educational equity. 170
framework into its mission statement in 2018.171
Using this new theory of change, Appleseed was able to continue
exerting influence on the movement for school integration even as
students’ and local communities’ initiatives increasingly led. In 2017,
IntegrateNYC and Appleseed commenced an ambitious initiative to
eliminate the practice of “screening” students into stratified middle
schools. This same year, with funds from SIPP, the District 1
community employed the P.S. 133 precedent to secure a
school-integration plan covering schools across the entire district. 172
Meanwhile, advocates in comparatively affluent District 15 and
Councilmember Lander convinced NYCDOE to commence a massive
public-engagement process to address segregation in the District’s
middle schools.173 In 2018, the process yielded a bold plan to remove
169. As discussed earlier, the thought of resolving school segregation through
litigation was a nonstarter for many lawyers that balked at the feasibility of such claims,
due in part to most recent court cases such as PICS as well as the costly and inefficient
nature of education litigation. See generally EATON, supra note 118 and accompanying
text (describing Appleseed’s perspective on integration litigation and more effective
uses of legal advocacy in the modern era).
170. See Real Integration, supra note 166.
171. See New York Appleseed’s Mission Statement Annotated, N.Y. APPLESEED,
https://www.nyappleseed.org/our-mission/ [https://perma.cc/DHQ6-9DS5] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2020).
172. See Matt Gonzales, City Views: City Schools Make a Downpayment on
Diversity,
CITYLIMITS
(Nov.
28,
2017),
https://citylimits.org/2017/11/28/cityviews-city-schools-make-a-downpayment-on-diver
sity/ [https://perma.cc/H8TL-WQ7T].
173. See Mayor de Blasio and Chancellor Carranza Announce District 15 Middle
School Diversity Plan and Launch $2M School Diversity Grant Program, OFF. MAYOR,
CITY
OF
N.Y.
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/478-18/mayor-de-blasio-chancellor-ca
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screens from the schools and use the P.S. 133-type set-aside admissions
plans to prioritize vulnerable populations. 174 Appleseed provided
critical guidance to both of these processes using its accumulated
knowledge on the issues.
From 2017 to 2019, Appleseed participated in a School Diversity
Advisory Group appointed by Mayor de Blasio. 175 Although likely
intended as a dilatory tactic by the Mayor, Appleseed’s ability to
devote large amounts of time and resources to the process helped lead
to a call to end middle school screens and other clear and bold
recommendations in the final report, demonstrating that the Mayor
and Chancellor could advance major advances in school integration
practically overnight. 176 In December of 2020, Mayor de Blasio
acceded to three years of advocacy and issued a temporary suspension
of the practice of screening students for middle schools in response to
the realities of the ongoing public-health crisis.177
The need for legal advocacy of all the modes described in this Essay
continues (and Appleseed and Orrick continue to serve in that role),
but today’s leadership of the movement is in the hands of affected
communities. Student leaders at IntegrateNYC and the more recent
Teens Take Charge are now well-represented in the media and at the
policy table. 178 Appleseed’s school integration work is directed by

rranza-district-15-middle-school-diversity-plan-and#/0
[https://perma.cc/KD4X-TE7N].
174. See SCH. DISTRICT 15 OF N.Y.C., D15 DIVERSITY PLAN: FINAL REPORT (2018),
http://d15diversityplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/190620_D15DiversityPlan_F
inalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD4H-T47L].
175. See School Diversity Advisory Group, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/vision-and-mission/diversity-in-our-schools/sch
ool-diversity-advisory-group [https://perma.cc/6Y7N-2E8Y] (last visited Oct. 26,
2020).
176. See generally SCH. DIVERSITY ADVISORY GRP., MAKING THE GRADE II: NEW
PROGRAMS
FOR
BETTER
SCHOOLS
(2019),
http://statenislander.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Making-The-Grade-II-New-Pro
grams-For-Better-Schools-by-SDAG.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMP6-N4QJ].
177. See 2020: Advancing Justice in a Year of Turmoil, N.Y. APPLESEED’S
YEAR-IN-REVIEW
(N.Y.
Appleseed,
New
York,
N.Y.),
https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Advancing-Justice-in-a-Year-of-Turmoil.html?s
oid=1125732021736&aid=BaM0WBFtkes [https://perma.cc/RY2T-V7R6] (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021).
178. For examples of these groups’ advocacy activities, see Christina Veiga, Report:

Eliminate Middle School Screens, Make High School Admissions More Fair Next
Year,
CHALKBEAT
(May
12,
2020,
5:40
PM),

https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2020/5/12/21256538/middle-school-screens-high-school-admis
sions [https://perma.cc/36LZ-9DEJ]; Segregation Is Killing Us . . . , TERRITORIAL
EMPATHY
(July
29,
2020),
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/b9d7b073400c4c18950469ef79efe98a
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Author Nyah Berg, whose graduate education was in education policy
rather than law.
CONCLUSION

New York City has only begun to address the segregation of its
public schools. Despite the progress described in this Essay, in 2019,
the UCLA Center for Civil Rights again identified New York State as
having the most segregated schools for African-American students:
65% of New York’s African-American students attended “intensely
segregated” schools.179 New York was also the second most segregated
state for Latino students.180
Yet now, the need for integration strategies is a prominent issue in
the public conversation, and NYCDOE is under significant pressure to
address segregation. Assessing the difference between the landscape
in 2011 and 2020, we believe that advocacy by legal advocates at
Appleseed and Orrick played an essential role in creating the
conditions for an integration movement to flourish and be rightfully
led by affected communities, students, and educators as we see
today.181
[https://perma.cc/QS23-AD6R]; Christina Veiga, Turning Up the Pressure for
Integration, NYC Students Plan Citywide School Boycott, CHALKBEAT (Feb. 5, 2020,

6:30
PM),
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2020/2/5/21178556/turning-up-the-pressure-for-integration-ny
c-students-plan-citywide-school-boycott [https://perma.cc/Z6BF-NYGM].
179. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS
CIVILES & CTR. FOR EDUC. & C.R., HARMING OUR COMMON FUTURE: AMERICA’S
SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS
65
YEARS
AFTER
BROWN
5
(2019),
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diver
sity/harming-our-common-future-americas-segregated-schools-65-years-after-brown/
Brown-65-050919v4-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E86N-3GVM]; see also New York City
Students Are Fighting for School Integration, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 29, 2019, 5:28
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/new-york-city-students-are-fighting-for-school-in
tegration [https://perma.cc/2WVV-KA64].
180. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 179, at 29.
181. An essential, but insufficient role: we could have accomplished nothing without
the work and advocacy — both parallel and coordinated — of entities and
organizations such as the Alliance for School Integration & Desegregation, the Asian
American Legal Defense Fund, the Century Foundation, District 28 Equity Now,
District 30 Equity Now, ERASE Racism, the Fair Housing Justice Center,
IntegrateNYC, Teens Take Charge, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the NYU
Metropolitan Center for Research on Equity and the Transformation of Schools, the
Center for Asian-American Children & Families, the Center for Public Education &
Leadership, Community Education Council 1, Community Education Council 13,
Community Education Council 15, District 15 Parents for Middle School Equity, the
P.S. 133 school community, the Arts & Letters School community, the P.S. 705
community, the Children’s School community, the Castle Bridge School community,
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That role, however, was not made effective through litigation — the
role most commonly played by legal advocates pushing for integration
in the twentieth century. Through this summary of the role of legal
advocacy over nearly ten years, we hope to challenge conventional
wisdom around the proper role of lawyers in supporting movements
for social change and argue for a broader definition of “legal
advocacy.” 182 Our experiences suggest that lawyers and those with
legal training must bring the same range of modes and skills to social
movements that they do to their clients (who typically avoid litigation
because of its excessive cost and delay), including exhaustive legal
research; carefully crafted memoranda, briefings, and reports
explaining that research for the public; negotiation; advocacy within
both legislative and administrative frameworks; familiarity with the
workings and professional style of government; and perhaps most of
all, the ability to analyze large, complex problems, develop a strategy
that breaks these problems into winnable advocacy goals, and adhere
closely to that strategy over a sustained period of time. While
acknowledging the unique size, diversity, and political geography of
New York City, this Essay draws lessons from our work for the benefit
of school-integration advocates across the country and offers a
framework that organizations and lawyers in other jurisdictions could
adopt as an alternative to litigation in advocating for school integration
and other social justice issues.
Attempting to embody the principles and values underlying
advocacy goals may well be critical for sustaining community, hope,
and a sense of purpose over a multi-year movement in which all that
stands in the way of goals is determined opposition. It is impossible
not to be moved by the stirring words of the late John Lewis talking
about how the great civil rights leaders of the twentieth century
proleptically created within their own movement the kind of “beloved

the Brooklyn New School community, the Earth School community, the
Neighborhood School community, the High School Application Advisory Committee
convened by the Feerick Center for Social Justice, the New York City Bar Association,
PARCEO, Council Member Brad Lander and his staff, Council Member Stephen
Levin and his staff, and, of course, scores of committed and courageous public servants
at NYCDOE and NYSED.
182. For a related argument, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering That Has No
Name: Title VI and the Meaning of Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1332
(2014) (noting that “[t]o understand all the ways lawyers implement Title VI, one must
resort to sometimes-vague phrases: multipronged lawyering, problem-solving
advocacy, and administrative lawyering”).
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community” that they were seeking to establish.183 The Authors of this
Essay find this vision of advocacy deeply moving.
When,
however,
ideological
commitments,
longstanding
polarization, or the fear of cooption prevent working within
government institutions or with influential individuals deemed tainted,
then our work suggests that the disinterested, dispassionate, and
professional demeanor of the legal advocate may be useful. In
apparent (if not actual) tension with the idea of affected communities
being their own best advocates stands the idea that the attorney should
never be their own client. Central to this adage is the notion that it is
precisely the ability of the attorney to maintain distance from the
emotions and passions of the dispute that makes them effective. 184
One does not have to abandon a commitment to the idea that the
communities affected by certain problems are typically in the best
position to craft solutions to those problems to think that there may be
certain instances where the somewhat removed stance of the legal
advocate may be required. This is likely to be particularly true when,
as was the case here, a movement led by affected communities has not
yet developed, the challenges are more technical than political, and a
relatively quick incremental victory seems possible.
Our work should also be distinguished, at least partially, from
“community lawyering” if that phrase means adopting a mere support
role for pre-existing initiatives led by communities directly affected by
segregation. Our strategies recognized that, on the one hand, simply
forcing NYCDOE to act in a top-down fashion — either through
litigation or administrative complaints premised on the rights of

183.
And you live that you’re already there, that you’re already in that [beloved]
community, part of that sense of one family, one house. If you visualize it, if
you can even have faith that it’s there, for you it is already there. And during
the early days of the movement, I believed that the only true and real
integration for that sense of the beloved community existed within the
movement itself.
John Lewis: Love in Action, ON BEING WITH KRISTA TIPPETT (July 23, 2020),
https://onbeing.org/programs/john-lewis-love-in-action-jan2017/#transcript
[https://perma.cc/Y6U3-Z6SX].
184. “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, [an attorney representing an attorney]
can provide a reality check — defendants can become so convinced of their
justifications that they can’t imagine how a jury could possibly disagree with them.”
Brian Palmer, If John Edwards Were to Represent Himself, Would He Have a Fool
for
a
Client?,
SLATE
(June
7,
2011,
6:08
PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2011/06/why-is-it-so-bad-for-an-attorney-to-repres
ent-himself.html [https://perma.cc/PU6F-6L26].
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individuals or by media pressure — was unlikely to generate successful
long-term integration planning informed by the priorities of
historically marginalized peoples. On the other hand, we recognized
that an important policy solution backed solidly by available evidence
and scholarly research (and still universally supported by mainstream
civil rights organizations) had largely fallen out of the public
conversation in New York City by 2011. Our work suggests that there
may be instances in which legal advocates can act responsibly and
productively to create models or templates, break down legal and
regulatory barriers (real or imagined), and force leaders to exercise the
minimal amount of leadership necessary to empower others to raise
questions and innovate so that issues and solutions can emerge into the
public debate.
Such a role may be especially appropriate for addressing large,
structural problems that extend beyond individual neighborhoods and,
in fact, have systemic impacts across entire cities or school districts. In
a school system of 1.1 million students, there are difficult questions
pertaining to who is in fact directly affected: should one focus on
students, parents, educators, principals? How does a government or
legal advocate meaningfully engage every community in a large city —
particularly a city of 8.5 million people and thousands of
neighborhoods?
Historian Thomas Sugrue describes how the
emphasis on “maximum feasible participation” in Johnson-era laws
precipitated a shift towards “community-development” issues assumed
to be limited to the boundaries of particular neighborhoods at the
expense of the large structural issues that were in fact exacerbating
local problems. 185 This development proved all-too-convenient to
many predominantly white communities in New York City wary of
integration efforts. As we asked before, if we agree that the mechanics
of systemic racism are entirely created by a white power structure and
typically often labyrinthine and invisible, is it fair or reasonable to
expect our most marginalized communities — often disconnected from
one another in a large metropolis — to have the time and resources to
explore legal, policy, and pedagogical issues of immense complexity?
Such a role for legal advocates may also be particularly appropriate
when widespread misunderstanding of the state of the law or the
impact of current policy decisions appear to be obscuring the full range
of solutions for affected communities to consider, when government
officials appear to be using legal issues as an excuse for failure to take

185. THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 368–74, 398–99 (2008).
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substantive action, or when government officials genuinely need
guidance on how to move forward. The combined effect of the Bush
Administration’s guidance and the even more extreme stance adopted
by NYCDOE represented an extraordinary hurdle that required
sustained advocacy by legal advocates both at the federal level and the
local level. Similarly, elementary school admissions policies for New
York City schools were opaque and largely unwritten. 186 Even
Appleseed and Orrick had to hire consultants early in 2011 to develop
a full understanding of those policies before we could analyze new
possibilities for the community task force later that year.
But if it was appropriate for Appleseed and Orrick to act with some
independence, it was also important for us to limit that independence.
Even in our first year of work, while we yielded to no one arguing for
a diverse P.S. 133, we simultaneously deferred to community task force
members on how to accomplish that goal. And we have continued to
maintain this posture in nearly all of the community meetings we
attend so long as we are assured that participants are acting in good
faith in the interest of school integration. Nearly all of our advocacy
goals — whether creating an admissions model, removing legal hurdles,
contributing to government grant programs, placing reporting
requirements on NYCDOE, or having NYCDOE adopt a policy
statement — had the effect of expanding the information and options
for promoting integration available to affected communities, rather
than dictating how to proceed. (An exception is our advocacy to
remove from community school districts the practice of “screening”
young children from educational opportunities based on evaluations of
“merit.”187 In this case, we cannot view a defense of such practices as
consistent with a good-faith goal of integration). As soon as
IntegrateNYC took shape, we immediately partnered with this
initiative, adopted its integration framework, aligned our policy goals,
and centered the voices of its students. Perhaps the best indicator of
our success is that leadership of the school integration movement is
now squarely in the hands of the students of New York City’s
segregated schools.188

186. The Chancellor’s Regulations purport to codify admissions policies, but they
are incomplete at best. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., REGULATION OF THE
CHANCELLOR, NO. A-101 (2020).
187. Letter from Philip Desgranges & Laura D. Barbieri, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to Hon.
Richard A. Carranza, Chancellor, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., and Members, Sch. Diversity
Advisory
Grp.,
N.Y.C.
Dep’t
of
Educ.
(May
1,
2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2019521-CompetitiveAdmissio
nsDOE050119.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG5S-SBYD].
188. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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The only conclusion we make with complete confidence is that the
broadest possible definition of “legal advocacy” is needed in thinking
about appropriate roles for lawyers in social change — perhaps even
broader than the already flexible definitions of “community lawyering”
we have discussed here. The full range of skills that legal organizations
today bring to their clients can also be employed successfully in
supporting social change. Beyond that, this Essay mainly intends to
raise questions. Our experience suggests that there may be at least
some instances in which “unaffected” legal advocates may play a role
in opening up new opportunities for advocacy, and that there may be
at least some instances in which the removed and dispassionate posture
of trained advocates may prove useful to supplement or galvanize
advocacy by affected communities.

